TL;DR
A core banking system holds the customer, the account, the balance and the transaction. Everything else in a bank is a channel onto it. Replacing one is the highest-risk project in banking technology, because the system cannot be switched off, the data cannot be approximated, and a bad cutover is visible to every customer at once.
Migrations fail for a predictable reason, and it is rarely the new platform. It is data: decades of accounts carrying exceptions, manual adjustments, products that no longer exist and balances whose history nobody can reconstruct. The new system is specified against the product catalogue as documented. The data arrives as the bank actually operated, which is a different thing.
Key points
- The Reserve Bank of India (Commercial Banks - Cybersecurity, Technology: Risk, Resilience and Assurance Framework) Directions, 2026, issued 31 July 2026, set a near-zero recovery point objective for critical systems and half-yearly disaster recovery drills. A migration now has to deliver a resilience posture, not just a working platform.
- Data migration is where programmes fail. Budget for it as the main workstream rather than a phase near the end.
- Parallel run is the only honest way to prove a migration, and it is the first thing cut when the programme runs late.
- The scarce person has finished a migration, not started one. That distinction is the whole search.
The Indian landscape
Indian banks run a mix of long-established core platforms and, increasingly, newer cloud-native systems alongside them.
| Category | Typical platforms | Characteristic |
|---|---|---|
| Established core banking | Infosys Finacle, Oracle FLEXCUBE, TCS BaNCS, Temenos, Intellect | Deep functional coverage, heavy customisation, long release cycles, large installed base and skills pool |
| Cloud-native and next-generation core | Thought Machine, Mambu, 10x, Zeta, M2P | Product configurability, API-first, faster release cadence, smaller proven-at-scale track record in India |
| Lending and NBFC core | Specialist loan management platforms | Different problem from deposit-side core, frequently confused with it in briefs |
The practical consequence for hiring is that the skills pools barely overlap. An engineer with ten years of Finacle customisation and an engineer who has built on a cloud-native core are solving different problems with different tools, and a brief that asks for both is describing a very small number of people.
A second consequence worth stating: most Indian migrations are not a clean replacement. They are a coexistence, where the new core takes new products or a new customer segment while the old core continues running the back book, sometimes for years. Designing and operating that coexistence is the actual job, and it is more demanding than either platform alone.
Why banks migrate, and why they delay
The reasons to move are consistent: product velocity, because launching a new deposit or lending product on a heavily customised legacy core takes quarters rather than weeks; cost, both licensing and the specialist maintenance skills that get scarcer each year; resilience, which the regulator now has firm views on; and the integration surface, because partner and embedded-finance arrangements assume APIs the older platforms were not built around.
The reasons to delay are equally consistent, and more persuasive in the room: the current system works, the migration risk is existential, the benefits are diffuse, and nobody's career improves by volunteering to run it. This is why migrations tend to be triggered by an external forcing function, a regulatory finding, a vendor end-of-support date, or a merger, rather than by a strategic decision taken calmly.
What the 2026 resilience directions changed
The Reserve Bank of India (Commercial Banks - Cybersecurity, Technology: Risk, Resilience and Assurance Framework) Directions, 2026, issued on 31 July 2026 and effective immediately, apply to commercial banks other than Small Finance Banks, Payments Banks and Local Area Banks, with foreign banks operating through branches on a comply-or-explain basis for selected chapters.
They matter to a migration because they raise the bar the target state has to clear.
| Requirement | Consequence for a migration |
|---|---|
| Recovery time objective kept minimal and recovery point objective near zero for critical systems | The target architecture must support near-zero data loss. This is an architectural decision made at design time, not a tuning exercise afterwards |
| Disaster recovery drills at least half-yearly for critical systems | The DR capability has to be real and exercised, and the programme has to leave it that way |
| Disaster recovery sites geographically well separated, with identical configuration to primary | Rules out several cheaper target designs and affects the cost case materially |
| Full operational testing from beginning of day to end of day | The whole daily cycle has to be provable, including batch, not just the online path |
| Incident reporting within six hours of detection to the RBI's DAKSH platform, with proactive notification to CERT-In | Detection and escalation have to work from day one of cutover, when they are least mature |
| Board-level IT Strategy Committee of at least three directors, independent chair with at least seven years managing information systems, meeting quarterly | The programme reports into a committee with genuine technical competence, which changes the quality of scrutiny |
| CISO at senior executive rank with no direct reporting relationship to the Head of IT, reporting to the executive director overseeing risk, briefing the board quarterly | Security sign-off on the migration comes from outside the technology organisation |
The last row deserves attention from anyone planning a programme. The security assessment of your migration is given by someone who does not report to the person running it, and who reports independently to the board. Programmes structured on the assumption that security is an internal technology matter encounter this late.
The migration patterns
Big bang. Everything moves in one cutover weekend. Lowest total cost, shortest coexistence, and the highest risk, because there is no meaningful rollback once customers transact on the new system. Still used, mostly by smaller institutions where the account count is manageable and the product set is simple.
Phased by product or segment. Move savings accounts, then current accounts, then term deposits; or move one region or one customer segment at a time. Lower risk per event, but creates a long period where customer data spans two systems and reconciliation between them becomes a permanent function.
Strangler, or coexistence. The new core takes all new business while the old core runs the back book, with a routing and aggregation layer in front so customers and channels see one bank. The old system is retired when its book naturally depletes or is migrated last. This is the dominant pattern for banks with a long tail of legacy products, and it trades a short sharp risk for a long operational cost.
Parallel run. Not an alternative to the others but the verification method for all of them: run both systems on the same inputs and compare outputs daily until they agree. It is the only honest proof that the new system does what the old one did, and it is almost always the first thing compressed when the programme slips. Programmes that cut parallel run discover their differences in production, with customers.
Where migrations actually fail
Data quality, which is the main one. A twenty-year-old book contains accounts with no valid address, interest computed by a rule nobody can now explain, products withdrawn a decade ago with a handful of customers still holding them, manual adjustments posted by people who have retired, and balances that are correct but unreconstructable from history. The new system has validation rules. The old data will not pass them. Every exception then needs a decision: fix, transform, carry across as-is with an override, or leave behind. There are usually tens of thousands of these.
Interest and charge calculation differences. The new core computes interest correctly by its own rules, which produce a slightly different number from the old core on some accounts. Slightly different, multiplied by the book, is a customer-facing and regulatory problem. Finding these before cutover requires a full recomputation comparison, which requires the parallel run.
The integration estate. A core system typically has between fifty and three hundred integrations: channels, payment rails, reporting, regulatory returns, the data warehouse, partner interfaces, and a long tail of small internal tools that nobody has documented. The inventory is always incomplete, and the items missing from it are discovered in production.
Batch and the daily cycle. End-of-day processing, interest accrual, charge application, regulatory extracts, statement generation. The online path gets the testing attention because it is visible. Batch is where the cutover weekend overruns.
Reconciliation during coexistence. Two systems holding parts of one bank must agree, continuously, and proving it is a daily operational function for the duration. This is the same discipline as reconciliation and breaks, applied internally rather than against external parties, and it is routinely under-resourced because it is seen as temporary.
The rollback that does not exist. Once customers have transacted on the new system, rolling back means reversing real money movement. Most programmes have a rollback plan on paper and a point of no return in practice, usually a few hours into the cutover. Knowing precisely where that point is, and who decides, is a programme discipline rather than a technical one.
Who you need
| Role | Owns | What separates a real one |
|---|---|---|
| Migration programme director | The whole programme, the cutover decision, the board relationship | Has completed a migration, including the parallel run and the retirement of the old system |
| Core banking architect | Target architecture, product mapping, coexistence design | Knows both the legacy platform's behaviour and the target's model, which is rare |
| Data migration lead | Extraction, transformation, exception handling, reconciliation of migrated balances | Talks about exception volumes and decision workflow, not about ETL tooling |
| Integration lead | The integration inventory and its delivery | Starts by assuming the inventory is wrong and goes to find the missing items |
| Testing and parallel run lead | Comparison harness, defect triage, the evidence of equivalence | Has defended a parallel run against schedule pressure |
| Resilience and DR lead | RTO and RPO delivery, drills, the regulatory evidence | Has run a real failover, not a tabletop exercise |
| Business readiness lead | Operations, branch and contact centre preparation | Understands that the people problem is as large as the technical one |
The person who matters most is the first row, and the qualifier is finishing. A great many people in Indian banking technology have worked on a core migration. A much smaller number have taken one through cutover, parallel run and decommissioning of the legacy platform. Those people are identifiable, they are employed, and they are approached individually. The method is described in how we search.
How to assess
Ask what they decommissioned. The clearest question in this domain. A migration that has not retired the old system has not finished, and a large share of programmes never do. Candidates who have switched off a legacy core remember the date.
Ask about the data exceptions. How many, how they were categorised, who decided, and how long it took. Specific numbers indicate real ownership. Vague answers about data cleansing indicate someone who was adjacent to the work.
Ask what they found in parallel run. Every parallel run finds differences. A candidate who says theirs matched immediately either did not run one properly or is not telling you about it.
Probe the cutover decision. "Who made the go or no-go call, on what evidence, and did you ever call no-go?" Programmes that have never deferred a cutover have usually been lucky rather than disciplined.
Test the coexistence thinking. "You will run two cores for three years. What does that cost you operationally?" Strong candidates immediately discuss reconciliation, reporting consolidation, dual skills and the risk of the legacy platform becoming unmaintainable.
Check the resilience understanding. Ask how they would meet a near-zero recovery point objective in the target design. This is now a regulatory requirement rather than an aspiration, and a candidate who treats it as a post-migration concern is planning a rework.
Common questions
Why do core banking migrations fail?
Most often on data rather than on the platform. A long-established book carries accounts with invalid details, products that no longer exist, manual adjustments and interest computed by rules nobody can reconstruct, and the new system's validation rules reject them. Each exception needs a decision and there are usually tens of thousands. The other recurring causes are an incomplete integration inventory, insufficient testing of the end-of-day batch cycle, and a parallel run that was compressed when the programme ran late.
What is a strangler or coexistence migration?
A pattern where the new core takes all new business while the old core continues running the existing book, with a routing and aggregation layer in front so that customers and channels see a single bank. The legacy platform is retired when its book depletes or is migrated last. It is the dominant approach for banks with a long tail of legacy products, because it avoids a single high-risk cutover, at the cost of running and reconciling two systems for an extended period.
What does the RBI's 2026 resilience framework require?
The Reserve Bank of India (Commercial Banks - Cybersecurity, Technology: Risk, Resilience and Assurance Framework) Directions, 2026, issued on 31 July 2026 for commercial banks other than Small Finance Banks, Payments Banks and Local Area Banks, require a minimal recovery time objective and a near-zero recovery point objective for critical systems, half-yearly disaster recovery drills, geographically separated disaster recovery sites with identical configuration to primary, full operational testing covering beginning of day to end of day, and incident reporting within six hours of detection to the RBI's DAKSH platform alongside proactive notification to CERT-In.
How long does a core banking migration take in India?
For a mid-sized bank, typically two to four years from decision to decommissioning of the legacy platform, and longer for a large bank or a coexistence approach. The cutover itself is a weekend; the programme around it is years. The most common planning error is treating data migration as a phase near the end rather than as the main workstream from the beginning, which is also the most common reason published timelines slip.
Should we hire a programme director or use the vendor's team?
Both, with the accountability held by the bank. Vendors bring platform expertise and implementation method, and their incentive is to reach go-live. The bank needs someone whose incentive is a correct migration, who can defend the parallel run against schedule pressure and call a no-go if the evidence requires it. Programmes run entirely by the implementation partner tend to cut exactly the verification steps that would have surfaced problems before customers did.
